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Abstract—Intelligent transport systems (ITS) facilitate road
traffic by periodically exchanging messages with neighbouring
vehicles, road side units (RSUs) and ITS stations. For security
reasons these messages will be encapsulated with security cre-
dentials to form secured messages (SMs) and will be inoperative
until the authentication completes. This creates a challenge
in a dynamic and dense road network where many SMs are
awaiting authentication. To address this problem, we propose
CAESAR, a criticality-aware Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) signature verification scheme that utilizes
multi-level priority queues (MLPQs) and Markov model to dis-
patch and schedule SMs. Simulation results verify the accuracy
of CAESAR and the enhancements in terms of several safety
awareness metrics compared with the existing schemes.
Index Terms—ITS, Authentication, Security;
I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent transport systems (ITS) is a core component of
the future traffic system. Equipped on-board units (OBUs)
and wireless data exchanging are essential requirements for
cooperative awareness, emergency warning notification, ef-
ficient route guidance and entertainments. ITS applications
broadcast their information to surrounding vehicles, RSUs
and ITS stations. These broadcast messages are known as
basic safety messages (BSMs) in the WAVE standard [1],
cooperative awareness messages (CAMs) and decentralized
environmental notification messages (DENMs) in ETSI stan-
dard [2]. Exchanged messages facilitate vehicles and stations
to extend their control beyond the non-line-of-sight (NLOS)
and develop a local dynamic map (LDM) containing a guid-
ance of road traffic [3], such as intersection collision warning,
wrong way driving warning, approaching emergency vehicle
warning application, etc. Because of the importance of LDM,
exchanging messages are an easy target for malicious users.
Hence, authentication is a key procedure in the transmission
of messages. Once a message is generated at the application
layer, a digital signature is added and it is encapsulated
as a secured message (SM) before transmission [4]. At the
receiver side, the received SM is placed into a message queue
where it will be verified before passing it to the relevant
application. The content of message cannot be aware by the
ITS application before it has successfully been verified.
For the road safety, vehicles are required to respond to
arrival SMs as soon as possible. However, this authentication
incurs additional communication and processing overheads
that decrease the quality of service (QoS) of ITS [5] [6]. Both
ESTI and WAVE recommended the usage of ECDSA instead
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Fig. 1: The exemplar of critical scenarios
of RSA algorithm for signing and verifying SMs to improve
the QoS. In addition, [7] [8] adopt the approach to verify SMs
nearby firstly, to achieve the road safety. But it could delay
the processing of critical SMs (CSMs) and hazard the safety
at the following three scenarios in Fig. 1.
• Vehicle A (40Mp/h) and vehicle B (30Mp/h): despite
vehicle A and B are geographically close compared to
all others, they cannot meet each other or cause any
dangerous issue, because they are in different directions
of the crossroad. However, if vehicle A verifies SMs from
vehicle B or vice versa, it could delay the CSMs from
other areas where cause dangerous.
• Truck C (100Mp/h) and vehicle B: since vehicle B is far
away in distance from truck C, vehicle B might process
the verification from truck C lately. But truck C is in a
high speed moving towards vehicle B, and trees amongst
in the middle of the road as a visual obstruction that
becomes a NLOS condition. This will cause a severe
accident if its CSMs cannot be verified in time.
• Vehicle E (70Mp/h) and others: Vehicle E as an emer-
gency vehicle is approaching in this area from a long
distance. Considering this is a busy area where vehicles
verified and processed SMs nearby firstly, before vehicle
E is closing, none of these vehicles could have enough
time to adjust their positions.
In this paper, we propose a new criticality-aware authen-
tication framework, CAESAR. It prioritizes the signature
verification of CSMs, rather than simply verifying the geo-
graphically close area. CAESAR classifies the received signal
strengths of SMs into several ranges and dispatches them into
MLPQs. This enables SMs from different areas to be placed
in different priority queues and hence verified rapidly. We
analyse the performance of CAESAR and compare it with
existing schemes using simulations. Results show that the
criticality-aware authentication framework can significantly
improve various performance metrics of safety applications.
II. RELATED WORK
A number of schemes have been proposed to reduce
verification processing overhead [4], [7]–[9]. These can be
regarded as two main aspects: the random, and the distant-
based signature verification.
The random based verification schemes [4] [9] choose a few
of random SMs for verification to reduce the congestion at the
security queue. The drawback of these random verifications
cannot guarantee the nearby situations or important SMs will
be verified and processed in time. [8] prioritizes the security
queue based on the distance between transmitter and receiver.
[7] also adopts the distance-based method with the K-means
clustering to classify the received SMs, which requires the
off-line training and a larger time complexity compared to
ours. In addition, as we mentioned in Section I, critical cases
are inevitably happening various areas in the real traffic.
Authentication solely relying on the distance could delay the
verification and processing of CSMs and it causes unnecessary
accidents.
A Markov chain (MC) is a sequence of random values, Xt,
whose value at a time interval, t. The value of a MC variable at
the present time is called its state. For any t ∈ time intervals,
the probability distribution of the state at time t+ 1 depends
on the state at time t, and does not depend on the previous
states leading to states at time t [10].
pi,j ≡ ~P is the probability that state j at time t to the
system is in state i. If the system has a finite number of
states (1, 2, · · · , S), then the MC model can be defined by the
transition probability matrix as Eq. 1, where
∑s
j=1 pi,j = 1.
~P =

p1,1 p1,2, · · · p1,s
p2,1 p2,2, · · · p2,s
...
. . .
...
ps,1 ps,2, · · · ps,s
 (1)
Therefore, we can define the transition matrix after m+ n
steps using Eq. 2 [10].
Pn+mi,j =
∑
k∈S
Pni,kP
m
k,j (2)
III. CAESAR: CRITICALITY-AWARE ECDSA SIGNATURE
VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK
In this section, we unfold CAESAR in details. The key idea
is to prioritize the verification of receiving SMs based on its
distribution of CSMs on different message queues as shown
in Fig. 2. Equipped sensors in the vehicle can receive SMs
from other surrounding vehicles or ITS-stations. Some of SMs
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Fig. 2: CAESAR system overview
are extremely critical in the road situation that we marked
them as the red colour, their criticality is unknown for ITS
applications before the verification. After the receiver gathers
its surrounding SMs, it then dispatches SMs into MLPQs
based on their signal strengths for being scheduled, verified
and processed. Experimental studies [11], [12] demonstrate
sensors can partition these received messages by its signal
strengths. Each one of message queues represents its geo-
graphical region by one interval of signal strength. The MLPQ
allows the vehicles to schedule the verification of SMs based
on the assigned priority. Using MLPQ and MC, CAESAR
schedules SMs from each message queue to verify based on
the distribution of CSMs amongst MLPQs. As a consequence,
CSMs are verified with improved outcomes compared to
others.
A. Dispatching SMs based on the physical distance into
multilevel queues
The first feature of CAESAR consists of dispatching SMs
to their corresponding message queue. Each one of message
queues has an interval of signal strength that indicates a SM
will be allocated to which message queue. For example, there
are k message queues, and each interval of signal strength is
[(ki − 1) · θ, ki · θ), where ki is the index of message queue,
and θ is the interval of signal strength that we can obtain
from Eq. 3, where ~µ is the vector of signal strengths for all
received SMs.
θ =
max(~µ)−min(~µ)
k
(3)
Using the received signal strengths and the number of
message queues, we can determine and dispatch SMs into
relative message queues, respectively. It is worth noting the
time complexity of this classification is O(n) compared to
O(ndk+1 · logn) in [7] by k-means clustering, which is more
practicable in the real case.
B. Criticality distribution by modelling Markov Chain
CAESAR’s second feature is about determining the priority
of MLPQ by modelling MC. In terms of MC, we consider
each state in the MC as the ratio of CSMs from all received
CSMs in MLPQs at one time slot, which is achievable at
the application layer. At each one of time slot, i.e., one
second, a vehicle receives SMs with various signal strengths
and dispatches them in message queues. Each one of MLPQs
contains a portion of CSMs. A transition between two states
represents the probability/portion of CSMs in MLPQs be-
tween two sequential time slots. For example, a three message
queue has one state [0.3, 0.1, 0.5] means 30% of CSMs from
all received CSMs are in the first message queue, q1, 10%
CSMs in q2 and 50% CSMs in q3. Given the observations
of received CSMs, X0, X1, · · · , Xt, we can obtain pi,j , the
probability of transition from state i to state j by Eq. 4.
pi,j = Pr[Xj |Xi] = Pr[qj ← qi | t ] = Cj
C
← Ci
C
(4)
where C is the total number of received CSMs within MLPQs
at time slot t, the number of received CSMs at message
queues, qi and qj , are represented as Ci and Cj , respectively.
Based on ITS safety applications, we can use a series
of observations regarding to the distribution of CSMs over
message queues to calculate the transition probability matrix.
Therefore, based on the current distribution of received CSMs
as the state and the transition probability matrix, we can use
Eq. 2 to calculate the distribution of CSMs of next state.
C. SM Queue Scheduler and ECDSA Signature Verification
The third feature of our proposed framework contains the
SM multi-level queue scheduling algorithm which aims at
extracting SMs from different queues based on the distribution
of CSMs to verify their signatures (using ECDSA), as listed in
Algorithm 1. During the first initial step (line 2 in Algorithm
1), all received SMs have been dispatched into relevant MLPQ
based on its signal strengths and ready to be scheduled. For
each one of scheduling, a random number between 0 and 1
is generated, pd, for determining the selected queue (line 3).
Eq. 2 is then applied to calculate the next distribution of CSMs
for MLPQs (line 4).
Then, roulette selection is adopted to select a queue, qi,
based on the calculated distribution of CSMs over MLPQs and
the determined number, pd (line 5). For the roulette selection
procedure (line 14), it will firstly iterate all probabilities
to generate the ratio of CSMs over MLPQs as Cumulative
Distribution Function (CDF). Then, to iterate each one of
CDF and compare it with pd. If pd is bigger than one of
probabilities, this queue is selected to be returned.
Once the selected queue, qi, is determined, message sched-
uler extracts the SM from the chosen queue to apply ECDSA
algorithm (line 6). If this SM is verified successfully, it will
pass to ITS applications to further process, such as build up
LDM. Otherwise, if it cannot be verified (due to malicious
data injection attacks), this message will be regarded as
invalid and discarded it, or a reputation module [13] can be
implemented to isolate the malicious nodes in the network,
which is outside the scope of this paper.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
We develop a simulation model to analyse the performance
of CAESAR. This simulation is used for SMs transmission
exchange between vehicles and RSUs. The packet size of a
SM including the security overhead is taken as 300 bytes.
Algorithm 1 Scheduling SMs to ECDSA signature verifica-
tion
1: procedure SECUREDMESSAGE SCHEDULE
2: while True do
3: The determined number, pd ← Random(0, 1)
4: The probability distribution, ~Pi ← Eq. 2
5: Selected queue, qi ← Roulette selection (pd, ~Pi)
6: Verification flag← ECDSA verify(qi)
7: if Verification flag 6= True then
8: Invalid message and discard it.
9: else
10: Valid message and pass it to ITS applications.
11: procedure ROULETTE SELECTION(pd, ~Pi)
12: for pi ∈ ~Pi do
13: CDF of message queues, F (x) += pi
14: for x ∈ F (x) do
15: if pd < x then
16: select x as qi
17: return qi
Hardware ECDSA_Sign (ms) ECDSA_Verify (ms)
OBU-ARMv7 27.9 33.7
Intel-i5 5.46 7.32
Intel-i7 1.85 2.21
TABLE I: The comparisons of ECDSA on different hardwares
Each vehicle generates 10 SMs per second with 6Mpps data
rate. We adopt ECDSA-256-SHA-256 algorithm from the
ETSI to sign and verify SMs. We evaluated the signature
and verification at three hardware platforms (OBU ARM v7,
Intel i5 and Intel i7), the results display in Table I. Due
to the road safety, specialized hardware security module or
trusted platform module will be utilized to accelerate the
cryptographic operations by using the higher CPU instead of
directly using OBU [6]. For simplicity, we choose 5ms and
7ms for signing and verifying, respectively. SMs that could
not get verified within 100ms time interval are dropped from
the security queue and this loss is termed as the cryptographic
loss.
To generate mobility traces, we choose the scenarios as
shown in Fig. 1. The critical cases are emerged from different
areas that based on three major distributions (Exponential,
Gaussian and Uniform) through five MLPQs within the sim-
ulation. A road network of 2km × 2km is used. The vehicle
density is set to 150 vehicles/km2 to create a dense network.
B. Simulation Results
We first evaluate the accuracy of CAESAR compared to our
generated traffic, which is composed of different distribution
of CSMs for incoming SMs in different areas. Then, CAESAR
compares the loss percentage of CSMs with three existing
techniques. The first one is the single queue first-come-first-
server (SQ-F), which is the default signature verification
mechanism in the WAVE and ETSI standards. The second
technique is the MLPQ first-come-first-server (MQ-F) [7]
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Fig. 4: The performance comparisons of CAESAR with others
and the third technique is MLPQ random signature verifi-
cation (MQ-R) that randomly picks SMs from its MLPQs. In
the end, we compare the end-to-end latency for CSMs and all
received SMs with three techniques.
1) Accuracy of CAESAR: The experimental results for
the accuracy of CAESAR on the prediction of CSMs as
in probability density function (PDF) are shown in Fig. 3,
which breaks down the accuracy by five message queues (Q-
1, Q-2, Q-3, Q-4 and Q-5). It can be seen from this figure
that CAESAR is fairly accurate. A further observation shows
that as the traffic distribution from the exponential to the
uniform, the average ratio of difference are float around 0.45.
Although a few of ups and downs at Q-4 in the Gaussian
distribution have some differences, CAESAR captures most
sharp changes through 5 message queues amongst these three
major distributions.
2) The performance comparisons of CAESAR with others:
The experiments in this subsection investigate the loss of
CSMs within a dense network. Results are presented in
Fig. 4(a). CAESAR significantly reduces the loss of CSMs
compared with other three approaches by around 30%, 26%
and 14%.
Moreover, we compare CAESAR in the end-to-end latency
for CSMs in Fig. 4(b). CAESAR improves the latency by
25ms, 14ms and 6.6ms, respectively. In addition, the latency
of all received SMs are primarily identical for MQ-F, MQ-R
and CAESAR, which proves the efficiency of CAESAR at
critical situations whilst it can guarantee the latency of total
received SMs.
V. CONCLUSION
We have described a priority based queuing approach to
reduce the signature verification time for CSMs in the ITS.
CAESAR adopts the message classification by the signal
strengths to dispatch into MLPQ. With the help of Markov
model, CAESAR assigns the relevant priority to MLPQ that
ensures CSMs have a rapid verification. Then, we have
compared our approach with the existing schemes and shown
its accuracy and a significant improvement in terms of cryp-
tographic packet loss and end-to-end delay.
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